"A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation"
Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1998
BY: TED O'DONOGHUE
Cornell University
Department of Economics
Contact: TED O'DONOGHUE
Email: Mailto:edo1@cornell.edu
Postal: Cornell University
Department of Economics
Uris Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
Phone: (607)255-6287
Fax: (607)255-2818
ABSTRACT:
This article investigates patent protection for a long sequence
of innovations where firms repeatedly supersede each other.
Incentives for R&D can be insufficient if successful firms earn
market profit only until competitors achieve something better.
To correct this problem, patents must provide protection against
future innovators. This article proposes using a patentability
requirement--a minimum innovation size required for patents. A
patentability requirement can stimulate R&D investment and
increase dynamic efficiency. Intuitively, requiring firms to
pursue larger innovations prolongs market incumbency because
larger innovations are harder to achieve, and longer market
incumbency implies an increased reward to innovation.
JEL Classification: O31, O32, O34
Robin Hanson
hanson@econ.berkeley.edu http://hanson.berkeley.edu/
RWJF Health Policy Scholar FAX: 510-643-8614
140 Warren Hall, UC Berkeley, CA 94720-7360 510-643-1884
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Received on Fri Dec 4 20:45:04 1998
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