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43. Bernal 1,966; Borgonio Gaspar 195455; Bosch Gimpera 1966; Caso 1966; Corona Nfifiez 1966; Davies 1972, 1977; Gorenstein 1963, 1966; Jiménez Moreno 1966; Paddock 1966a, 1966b, 1966c; Palerm 1956; Phillips 1979. |
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44. In contrast, Skinner (1977b:30845) suggests that, in traditional China, the distribution of military might is greatest at the periphery of a political system and least at the center. |
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1. For the historical growth of empires as a result of the ability to physically link and administer them, see Taagepera 1968, 1978a, 1978b, 1979. |
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2. For a more detailed consideration of the relationship of imperial system to the Aztec economy and the structure of their society, see Hassig 1985:3150. |
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3. Luttwak 1976. |
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4. E.g., Caplow 1968. Modern coalition theory offers considerable insights into the way alliances are formed and why, but the idea that they form as minimal winning coalitions is not entirely warranted in this case. Normally, forming the smallest dominant coalition allows each partner to retain the largest share of power and spoils, but this is inapplicable in the hegemonic case for two main reasons, one practical and the other structural. First, forming the smallest winning coalition depends on an accurate assessment of the competitors, a capability largely lacking in Mesoamerica. Second, because hegemonic empires are held together by the perception of the empire's power, a minimal victory is inadequate: an empire must impress its power on the conquered so that local rulers continue their obedience based on that perception. As a result, Mesoamerican coalitions formed in different ways than would have been predicted by modern coalition theory. |
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5. Goldberg and Findlow 1984:378. |
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6. Although some revolts were reactions to events in the Triple Alliance, others probably resulted from purely internal factors, such as the death and succession of the polity's own rulers. However, there is inadequate information to test this thesis. There may, in fact, have been more revolts near the heart of the empire (see Holt 1976:61), reflecting the greater length of time these provinces were under Aztec domination. But what constituted a "revolt" is unclear: all records of "revolts" cannot be taken at face value (see chapters 915.). |
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1. E.g., Bandelier 1880; Borgonio Gaspar 195455; Bray 1968:18790; Canseco Vincourt 1966:7580; Davies 1972; Monjarás-Ruiz 1976:24446; Orozco y Berra 1978, 1:2067; F. Peterson 1962:15556; Piho 1972a, 1974; Soustelle 1970:4247; Stenzel 1976; Vaillant 1966:21720. |
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2. One problem in assessing rank of soldiers in the Aztec army lies in interpreting the terms employed in their descriptions. It is difficult to distinguish (1) when a term refers to general classifications of warriors, such as |
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