"Employee Ownership of Firms"
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 1998
BY: HENRY HANSMANN
Yale University, Law School
Contact: HENRY HANSMANN
Email: Mailto:henry.hansmann@yale.edu
Postal: Yale University, Law School
Box 208215
Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520-8215 USA
Phone: (203)432-4966
Fax: (203)432-1040
ABSTRACT:
Once widely considered just a theoretical curiosity or an
ideological aspiration, employee ownership of enterprise has
attracted considerable interest in recent years as a practical
matter of organization. In the West, this interest derives in
considerable part from the decline of unionism and the resulting
search for other means of assuring efficiency and equity in
labor contracting, while in the East, interest in employee
ownership has been stimulated by the rapid market-oriented
ownership structures that stop short of a direct leap into full
finance capitalism.
This essay explores the relative efficiency advantages and
disadvantages of employee ownership with respect to other forms
of ownership -- in particular, investor ownership -- and seeks
to explain why employee ownership has become widespread in some
industries, such as the service professions, while it remains
rare in many others. The general conclusion offered is that
employee ownership appears relatively efficient in a broad range
of circumstances so long as control of the firm can be placed in
the hands of a class of employees who have highly homogeneous
interests. Where, however, this condition cannot be met -- as is
commonly the case -- other forms of ownership typically have the
advantage.
Robin Hanson
hanson@econ.berkeley.edu http://hanson.berkeley.edu/
RWJF Health Policy Scholar, Sch. of Public Health 510-643-1884
140 Warren Hall, UC Berkeley, CA 94720-7360 FAX: 510-643-8614
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Received on Wed Oct 14 00:43:39 1998
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