"Creating Illegal Immigrants"
BY: GIL EPSTEIN
Bar-Ilan University
ARYE HILLMAN
Bar-Ilan University
AVI WEISS
Bar-Ilan University
Paper ID: CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 1796
Date: January 1998
Contact: AVI WEISS
Email: Mailto:weissa1@ashur.cc.biu.ac.il
Postal: Bar-Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 52900 ISRAEL
Phone: (972 3) 531 8934
Fax: (972 3) 535 3180
Co-Auth: GIL EPSTEIN
Email: Mailto:epsteig@mail.biu.ac.il
Postal: Bar-Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 52900 ISRAEL
Co-Auth: ARYE HILLMAN
Email: Mailto:hillman@ashur.cc.biu.ac.il
Postal: Bar-Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 52900 ISRAEL
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ABSTRACT:
Governments have rarely been successful in adhering to intended
consequences of temporary guest-worker policies. The conduit for
legal entry of workers has resulted in a population of illegal
workers, as the initially legal workers make the move to illegal
employment. In this paper we examine the effectiveness of
instituting a bond which seeks to make the legal employer the
enforcement agent of the government. Our model shows how the
bond affects the wage differential between legal and illegal
employment of migrant workers, and thereby the incentives for
transfer from legal to illegal employment and the extent to
which workers remain illegally.
JEL Classification: F22, J61
Robin Hanson
hanson@econ.berkeley.edu http://hanson.berkeley.edu/
RWJF Health Policy Scholar, Sch. of Public Health 510-643-1884
140 Warren Hall, UC Berkeley, CA 94720-7360 FAX: 510-643-8614
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Received on Thu Aug 20 18:50:25 1998
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