AltInst: Employer Bonds for Guest Worker Visas

From: Robin Hanson <>
Date: Thu Aug 20 1998 - 11:36:58 PDT

"Creating Illegal Immigrants"

              Bar-Ilan University
           ARYE HILLMAN
              Bar-Ilan University
           AVI WEISS
              Bar-Ilan University

Paper ID: CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 1796
    Date: January 1998

 Contact: AVI WEISS
  Postal: Bar-Ilan University
           Ramat Gan, 52900 ISRAEL
   Phone: (972 3) 531 8934
     Fax: (972 3) 535 3180
  Postal: Bar-Ilan University
           Ramat Gan, 52900 ISRAEL
  Postal: Bar-Ilan University
           Ramat Gan, 52900 ISRAEL

Hard Copy Paper Requests:
 CEPR Discussion Papers are charged at the rate of 5(British
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 requested. To order papers contact CEPR Discussion papers, 90-98
 Goswell Road, London EC1V 7DB, UK. Phone:(44) 171 878 2900.
 Fax:(44) 171 878 2999.

 Governments have rarely been successful in adhering to intended
 consequences of temporary guest-worker policies. The conduit for
 legal entry of workers has resulted in a population of illegal
 workers, as the initially legal workers make the move to illegal
 employment. In this paper we examine the effectiveness of

 instituting a bond which seeks to make the legal employer the
 enforcement agent of the government. Our model shows how the
 bond affects the wage differential between legal and illegal
 employment of migrant workers, and thereby the incentives for
 transfer from legal to illegal employment and the extent to
 which workers remain illegally.

JEL Classification: F22, J61

Robin Hanson
RWJF Health Policy Scholar, Sch. of Public Health 510-643-1884
140 Warren Hall, UC Berkeley, CA 94720-7360 FAX: 510-643-8614

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Received on Thu Aug 20 18:50:25 1998

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