"A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction"
BY: ELMAR WOLFSTETTER, MOTTY PERRY, SHMUEL ZAMIR
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=129789
http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/wt1/dp98.htm
ABSTRACT:
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is
frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and
acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same
expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is
less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.
Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
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Received on Wed Dec 8 00:35:42 1999
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