"Expanding the Welfare System: A Proposal for Reform"
BY: J. MICHAEL ORSZAG
University of London, Birkbeck College
DENNIS J. SNOWER
University of London, Birkbeck College
Paper ID: CEPR Discussion Paper A1.15 WP 1674
Date: 1997
Contact: J. Michael Orszag
E-Mail: MAILTO:morszag@economics.bbk.ac.uk
Postal: University of London, Birkbeck College
Department of Economics, 7-15 Gresse St.,
London W1P 2LL, United Kingdom
Phone: 44 (0) 171 631-6427
Fax: 0171 631 6416
Co-Auth: MAILTO:dsnower@economics.bbk.ac.uk
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This proposal involves the establishment of `welfare
accounts' for every person in a country. There are four
accounts: a retirement account (covering pensions), an
unemployment account (covering unemployment support), a human
capital account (covering education and training), and a
health account (covering insurance against sickness and
disability). Unlike current welfare state systems - where
welfare services are financed predominantly out of general
taxes - people would make ongoing, mandatory contributions to
each of these welfare accounts. The balances in these
accounts would cover people's major welfare needs, with the
government setting mandatory minimum contribution rates and
maximum withdrawal rates. The government would operate within
two budgetary systems: one in which non-welfare expenditures
are financed through the existing array of taxes; and another
in which public-sector expenditures on welfare services are
financed through payments from people's welfare accounts. The
government could redistribute income across people's welfare
accounts, but these redistributions would be constrained to
those of the balanced-budget variety: total (economy-wide)
taxes on each of the welfare accounts would be equal to total
transfers into each of accounts. The public and private
sectors would provide welfare services on an equal footing,
setting prices for these services and competing with one
another for the custom of the welfare account holders. We
argue that moving from current welfare state systems to a
welfare account system would play an important role in
reducing unemployment, encouraging labour force
participation, promoting skills, reducing governments'
budgetary pressures, cushioning people against economic risk,
ensuring efficient provision of health and education
services, providing social safety nets and redistributing
incomes more efficiently.
JEL Classification: E61, E62, E64, H11, H23, H24, H41, H42,
H51, H52, H53, H54, H61, I11, I22, I28,
I38, J68
__________________
Robin Hanson
hanson@econ.berkeley.edu http://hanson.berkeley.edu/
RWJF Health Policy Scholar, Sch. of Public Health 510-643-1884
140 Warren Hall, UC Berkeley, CA 94720-7360 FAX: 510-643-2627
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Received on Mon Jun 22 21:00:27 1998
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