poly: Re: Arrow's Social Choice Theorem / Borda count

From: <phoenix@ugcs.caltech.edu>
Date: Wed Apr 26 2000 - 22:43:44 PDT

Counter-paper:
http://bcn.boulder.co.us/government/approvalvote/altvote.html

claims Borda is highly manipulable. But it also seems to criticize it for not
electing the Cordorcet winner, whereas Saari claims that is a false goal.
Elsewhere I've seen Saari say that anything which will break Borda will break
any other scheme as well. And there's also this on Borda manipulation:

http://link.springer-ny.com/link/service/journals/00355/bibs/8015002/80150289.htm

-xx- Damien X-)
Received on Wed Apr 26 22:45:09 2000

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