poly: Re: Arrow's Social Choice Theorem / Borda count

From: Robin Hanson <rhanson@gmu.edu>
Date: Thu Apr 27 2000 - 08:31:36 PDT

At 10:43 PM 4/26/2000 -0700, phoenix@ugcs.caltech.edu wrote:
>this URL on Borda counting, ...
>claims Borda is highly manipulable. But it also seems to criticize it for not
>electing the Cordorcet winner, whereas Saari claims that is a false goal.
>Elsewhere I've seen Saari say that anything which will break Borda will break
>any other scheme as well. And there's also this on Borda manipulation:

I never cared that much for Borda counting, but I do like approval
voting, which is intuitive and easy to explain, and
does seems to clearly improve on simple plurality.

For listeners: approval voting is where each voter gets to vote for as many
or few candidates as you want. The winners is the one with the most votes.

Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
Received on Thu Apr 27 08:35:57 2000

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