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more. Even if not as well trained as the Aztec troops, the defending army knew the terrain and presumably had allies close at hand, ample supplies of foodstuffs, and armories immediately accessible. Thus to ensure such a conquest the Aztecs would have had to dispatch an army of at least two and probably three xiquipilli, totalling 24,000 combatants and an additional 12,000 support personnel. This both tripled the food requirements and lengthened the campaign, because each xiquipilli began marching on succeeding days. An additional two days would be required for each march between battles, resulting in a campaign of at least 55 days (without formal rest days en route) and a food cost of 1,881,000 kilograms (4,147,000 pounds) of maize. Given this expense, it is likely that the Aztecs either entered the area with only a token force or they entered with an army but did not significantly penetrate the region or engage in any major battles. |
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Itzcoatl's last major campaign extended south of the basin of Mexico into areas adjacent to his previous campaign. Tenochtitlan, Tlacopan, and Tetzcoco sent a joint army to aid Xiuhtepec (3 to 4 days distant) in the conquest of Cuauhnahuac (2 to 3 days distant), with the result that both cities became tributaries.
58 But instead of marching as a single unit, the Aztecs divided their forces into three separate armies. The Aztec army went by way of Ocuillan to attack from the west (3 to 5 days' march), the people of Tlacopan went by way of Tlazacapechco to attack from the north (2 to 3 days' march), and the Tetzcocas went by way of Tlalquiltenanco to join the Xiuhtepecas and attack from the east and south (6 to 7 days' march if they marched via Chalco); the return for all armies was 2 to 3 days' march due north. The purpose of dividing forces was not surprise, since intelligence traveled much faster than marching armies, but logistical and tactical. Marching by separate routes distributed the burden of supplying the army among a greater number of subject towns. But more significantly, it also ensured that the Triple Alliance could attack Cuauhnahuac from several sides simultaneously. Had the army proceeded en masse along one route, the numerically inferior Cuauhnahuacas could have attacked it at any pass, bottling up the larger army at a site where only a few troops could have engaged them at any one time, thus nullifying the Aztecs' numerical advantage. By approach- |
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